



Threats of force by prison officers in a male custodial institution. 
An ethnographic account  
Luigi Gariglio 
 
Prison ethnography; Psychiatric forensic hospital; Prison officers; Threat of force; Emotions; Micro-
sociology of violence; interactionism; phenomenology. 
 
 
This paper focuses on the practice of using the threat of force within a custodial setting. Prison 
ethnographers have rarely focused their observations on prison officers’ threats of the use of force or on the 
actual use of force, partly due to the difficulty of access. The theoretical framework adopted here is mainly 
grounded on Collins’ interactionist approach and, concurrently, Popitz’s phenomenology of power. The 
ethnography was conducted observing the daily work of officers on duty as well as the interventions by 
emergency squads. In terms of structure, this paper introduces the issue of threatening the use of force, 
presents the research goals, and then unpacks the theoretical framework. The final section analyses the 
structure of a ‘critical event’, introducing the idea of ‛status magnet/status shield’ as a tool to integrate the 
interactionist focus; it then defines and describes prison officers’ symbolic threats and credible threats of 
the use of force. Those are two relevant means of influence that officers would usually use in the case of a 








The threat of force by prison officers is a common practice within custodial 
organizations; it is embedded in the day-to-day relations between the keepers and the 
kept, where disputes and verbal assaults are not rare (Wästerfors, 2011), and where a 
variety of ‘peacemaking’ practices is used (Liebling et al., 2011). In Italy, the use of force 
is a legitimate duty of prison officers, regulated and prescribed by law. It is observable in 
many custodial institutions, such as prisons, forensic psychiatric hospitals (Miravalle 
2015) and immigration detention centres (Campesi 2013; Bosworth 2014). The threat of 
force featured frequently in the custodial complex for adult males where the fieldwork for 
this article was carried out. There, prisoners were urged to follow formal and informal 
sets of rules under continual direct surveillance by prison officers; the use of force was 
always implicitly (Gariglio, 2017) in the picture.  
 There are at least three reasons to focus on how prison officers treat the use of 
force in practice during routine interactions with inmates (as well as with psychiatric 
patients and migrants) in custodial institutions. First, the threat to use force can 
traumatically affect psychological wellbeing and mental health of inmates. Also, in the 
case of physical interventions by officers, bodily integrity can also be at risk (the fact that 
prison population has a high rate of blood-transmissible diseases should not be 
overlooked). Second, the threat and the use of force in custodial institutions is very much 
a current issue in the Italian public media. Lastly, within the micro-sociology agenda, the 
study of the threat of force and of actual use of force reveals types of interaction that 
                                               
1 The words ‛prisoner’ and ‛kept’ are used to refer to both defendants and sentenced inmates, and to psychiatric patients 
either subject to criminal proceedings or under sentence.  
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resonate with the broader fields of prison ethnography and the sociology of violence 
(Collins, 2008).  
 However, to the best of my knowledge, the threat of the use of force has not yet 
been a major focus of inquiry in prison ethnography in Europe. The issue is particularly 
relevant in Italy, a country where access to the prison facilities for researchers is typically 
restricted if compared for example to the UK, France or the Netherlands (Ferreccio e 
Vianello, 2015), and where, consequently, the accountability of prison officers is limited. 
In Italy, researchers are usually only allowed to do interviews with selected individuals;2 
moreover, ‛over half of the country’s prison population finds itself […] confined to 
minimum living spaces and living under daily sedation’ (Vianello, 2013: 31). There, ‛very 
few [inmates] manage to gain access to “treatment”’.3 One must remember, however, that 
prison officers, at least in relation to my experience, are also victims of their working 
environment; moreover, the job of the prison officer is also publicly stigmatized (Fassin, 
2015). I observed officers working under conditions which can hardly be regarded as safe 
(e.g. the absence of personal and environmental alarms in the kitchen, where prison 
officers have no weapons and prisoners have knives, or the insufficient numbers of 
officers who regularly escort overly large numbers of so-called ‛dangerous inmates’). In 
many conversations, officers have defined their own working condition as neither 
respecting their personal safety, nor their health and psychological wellbeing, despite all 
managerial efforts to improve and humanize prison conditions (Buffa, 2015).  
 The relevance of the officers’ threats (and the duty of using force) is, however, not 
limited to the Italian penal system and can be extended, to a different degree, to other 
contexts, times and geographies. In the 1980s Marquart (1986, pp. 348–49) remarked that 
‘the threat of force by guards is always present’. About 30 years later, despite the decency 
agenda4 as well as other reforms, the issue of prison violence remains a central concern. 
Even prison researchers, partly also for reasons of self-censorship, have not taken 
thoroughly into account this phenomenon (Drake, 2015). Certainly, critical criminologists 
such as Sim (2008), Scott (2008, 2015), Gonnella (2013) and Ruggero and Ryan (2013), 
have done important work to monitor and criticize the alleged wrongdoings, abuses and 
crimes committed by few officers. However, here I intend to focus on something 
different, which has hardly ever been studied as such. This paper strongly states that it is 
also urgent to focus ethnographically on officers’ duty to use force, particularly on the 
practice of threatening the use of force that frequently precedes it. It is urgent not only 
because threatening and using force is part of the officers’ normal routine and deserves 
attention as such, but also because officers do it regularly: it is part of the job they do 'on 
our behalf' and falls within the overall goal of ‘peace-making’. Paraphrasing William 
                                               
2 In Italy, a professional group of almost 39,000 people, of whom about 3,500 are women, work as prison officers 
managing and controlling a population of 52,754 inmates of whom 2,210 are women . 
3 In my fieldwork, prisoners and patients had a very efficient medical service available on the wing. The situation 
inside Italian prisons has improved significantly in terms of (average) overcrowding since 2013. At 30 September 2015, 
there were 52,264 prisoners, 17,251 of whom were foreign citizens. 
(https://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_1_14_1.wp?facetNode_1=1_5_32&previsiousPage=mg_1_14&contentId=SST
1182705). However, in some institutions the overall Italian prison condition remains critical.  
4 The Prison Reform Trust writes: ‛the Prison Service’s decency agenda requires that: no one is punished outside the 
rules; prisoners are protected from harm, including harm to them as a result of the prison experience; the regime 
provides them with enough variety and choice to make imprisonment bearable; they receive fair and consistent 
treatment by staff; and they are held in clean, properly equipped and properly maintained facilities’ 
(http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/Portals/0/Documents/IEP%20Briefing%20Prison%20Reform%20Trust.pdf). 
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Terrill’s writing on the coercive tactics of the police (2014), I would state that ‛a portion 
(a good portion) of the coercive tactics used by [prison officers] is wholly necessary and 
legal’ (2014: 6; emphasis added). At least, that was definitely my experience. 
Furthermore, the capability of using force lawfully is not only one of the prison officers’ 
duties, but it is also the duty that contradistinguishes the job of the prison officer from the 
rest of the prison staff, such as social workers (Bennett et al., 2008). Introducing the 
study of the lawful use of force, rather than focusing only on unlawful uses, such as the 
alleged officers’ wrongdoings and crimes, might help to better address the complexity of 
the work of prison officers as well as the practice they implement as a last resort, either 
lawfully or not.  
 This paper focuses specifically on male5 prison officers threatening the use of 
force on male inmates performed by the emergency squad in an attempt to control and 
guarantee ‛order and security’. These kind of emergency interventions were performed in 
very similar ways both in the forensic psychiatric hospital and in the prison.6 Indeed, both 
institutions were hosted in identical, adjacent facilities within the same building. The 
ethnography was based in one closed-cell regime wing of the forensic psychiatric hospital 
where some ‛very violent convicts’ were locked up for a minimum of 20 hours a day. 
That wing was (and still is today, as of 26 May 2016) under prison officers’ authority.7 
Officers are in charge of patrolling the wing to guarantee ‛order and security’ 
independently of other staff members that might also occasionally be present on the wing 
performing their duties. On the wing, 25 cells hosted a number of prisoners that varied 
from 31 to 44. An approximately equal number of inmates and psychiatric patients were 
hosted one next to the other in 25 cells in a row. Five-to-seven cells would host one 
prisoner, individuals that were too violent to be left unescorted with others in the same 
cell. All others cells would host two prisoners (but a few years ago, they would even host 
three prisoners in cells designed for one inmate only).  
Disputes and fights within the cells and in the yards would occur frequently; yet, 
they would not necessarily lead to intervention by officers, much less to intervention by 
the emergency squad (officially called either squadra emergenza or squadra disponibili; 
inmates and patients would call it la squadretta). Officers on duty would often turn a 
blind eye, exercising their discretional authority (Liebling 2000). Low-ranking officers 
talking informally would frequently use the official penal categories into which prisoners 
are formally classified by law, either the Criminal Code or Prison Rules – for instance, 
‛Giorgio is a 222’ (an offender not guilty by reason of insanity), or ‛the newcomer will be 
a 4-bis’ (an offender sentenced for organized crime and therefore excluded from parole). 
Asked about the meaning of such codes, officers would rarely be able to even explain 
them. In day-to-day informal interactions among low-ranking staff on the wing or in the 
canteen, however, officers would more frequently use words such as ‛criminal’ or ‛crazy’ 
to refer to prisoners. Although the use of such language was widely accepted, it remains 
problematic as it tends to generate perverse effects on the vulnerable persons in custody 
in terms of their wellbeing, self-esteem and the right to humane treatment.  
                                               
5 In Italy, prison officers working on a wing must be of the same sex as the prisoners; this ethnography was only 
conducted in a male wing, therefore all prison officers on duty were male.  
6 In the forensic psychiatric hospital, however, prison officers would also use force, following a psychiatrist’s request, 
to compel patients to accept a necessary medication. 
7 Other parts of that institution were governed differently, mainly by medical staff. 
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 This paper analyses threats that occur when the prison officers and inmates remain 
physically separated by either a cell door, or a gate, or any other barrier – i.e., when 
inmates are locked up in their cells, exercising in the yard, or locked up in a wing with a 
'dynamic security' regime, in which prisoners can walk free in the corridor and prison 
officers stay off the wing. On the contrary, whenever an accident or ‘critical event’ (see 
section 4) would suddenly erupt without any physical barrier separating officers and 
inmates, the threatening phase would often be skipped and the use of force would 
abruptly enter the picture and create a new scenario (see Gariglio, 2015, 2017). 
 In the next sections, I first outline a few research questions and present the 
research process. I then illustrate the interactionist theoretical perspective and Popitz’ 
phenomenological interpretation of threatening and being threatened. Finally, in the last 
two sections, I discuss the coming about of ‘critical events’ and the practice of 
threatening the use of force, either symbolically or practically.   
 
2. Researching the threat of force inside a psychiatric forensic hospital 
 
I have observed a custodial institution in the north of Italy that hosts 169 inmates and 185 
prison officers, most of which are male (data unavailable).8 A major forthcoming 
publication, entitled ‘Doing’ coercion in custodial settings (Gariglio, 2017), will present 
this research in full. Provisionally, this paper focuses on describing how threats of force 
are performed by officers. In order to observe and analyse those practices 
ethnographically, different positions and approaches could have been adopted. My 
epistemology is grounded on critical realism, while my theoretical framework is a 
bricolage of interactionism and phenomenology. Many ethnographers, including myself, 
agree with Clifford when he challenges a positivist approach to ethnography. However, I 
follow Clifford not only in his claim that ‛Ethnography is a hybrid textual activity: it 
traverses genres and disciplines’ (1986: 26), but also, more importantly, when he states 
clearly that ethnography is not only, nor primarily, literature (1986; contra, Kaufman, 
2015). This paper is the textual output of a lot of interactions, co-presence, observations, 
shared emotions, dialogues, banters, tears and so on, that have lasted for something less 
than two years. This research was a daunting experience for me, a feeling shared by a lot 
of prison research. Finishing it left me filled with disturbing memories, psychological 
distress, and the anxiety that I experienced in the institution. Nonetheless, I eventually 
left the place, whilst most officers and some prisoners continue to live there. Doing 
prison ethnography has also been a very rewarding experience, and on a few occasions 
was also unexpectedly hilarious (see Kraska, 1996). All in all, I am still regularly in 
contact with some of the prison officers via Whatsapp, Facebook, SMS and phone calls. 
 Initially, I started this research aiming to study the daily work and life of prison 
officers. Staying in the wing and eye-witnessing the events, I got to know that the threat 
of the use of force would constitute a long-lasting chain of interactions that occur 
routinely (Collins, 2004) regardless the presence of observers. This fact was completely 
unexpected to me, as was as my uncensored access to those practices (contra Ferreccio e 
Vianello, 2015). I considered it as a case of serendipity (Jacobsson et al., 2013). Field 
experience led me to progressively re-work my initial project. Eventually, doing 
                                               
8 Data refer to 8 January 2016 (source: Ministero della Giustizia. 
https://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_data_view.wp?liveUid=2014DAPCARD&Nome=UFF56869) 
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fieldwork and re-reading my notes, the research ended up focusing on the issue of the 
duty officers have to resort to force. Of course, like any other custodial facility, the one in 
question constitutes by and of itself a constrained coercive environment (Jewkes and 
Johnston, 2013; Anastasia et al., 2011; Foucault, 1979) where ‛implicit coercion’ 
(Gariglio, 2017) would always be in the picture and imbue all interactions between the 
keepers and the kept. I did not aim to stand ‛on the prison officers’ side’.9 Nonetheless, 
during my fieldwork, I built close relationships with a group of four officers.10 Although 
most officers seemed either sympathetic or indifferent to me, at least one harboured a 
hostile attitudes, which he proved every now and then. I was not particularly interested in 
building a friendly relationship with prisoners, for I was aware that, by doing so, I would 
have easily compromised the trust prison officers had in me. However, at the end I built 
some kind of rapport with a few prisoners; some even asked to be formally interviewed, 
and I was pleased to do so.  
Most of the time, only one officer worked on the wing. For some hours each day, 
excluding weekends and holidays, however, another officer would be intermittently on 
the wing to escort prisoners to medical visits and to ensure security for non-custodial staff 
working in the infirmary. Officers usually treated me fairly, granting me respect and some 
trust. I experienced unlimited access to the spaces of the institution: on no occasion (at 
any time, day or night) was I refused access. I worked for no less than 1,400 hours, 
covering all the shifts, usually for at least 12 hours a day. About 90 percent of the time 
was spent in only one wing, about 5 percent in the yards, and the rest just hanging 
around. From the outset, and during the entire ethnography, I worked without a badge, 
holding a small paper notebook and pen visibly in my hands to identify my researcher 
status. I saw hundreds of interactions in which either prisoners challenged officers (and, 
on a few occasions, me), or officers threatened or used force against prisoners. I also saw 
prisoners assaulting officers in front of me, literally walking over my feet and pushing me 
to the floor. I frequently heard prisoners screaming, yelling, and insulting each other or 
officers; and I saw episodes of sexism, machismo, racism and Islamophobia on both sides 
of the barred door. To be honest, however, I am not sure whether those kinds of episodes 
are more likely to occur within the walls rather than beyond them. I saw people cutting 
their belly with a razor blade and, afterwards, the doctor and nurse healing them. I saw 
people doing hunger strikes, or fighting. I saw people violently resisting the allocation of 
a prisoner to their cell. In other words, I saw ‛nothing special’, just ‛normal prison life’ as 
a few officers had described it to me.  
I now turn to the description of my theoretical bricolage. 
 
3. Forward panic and credible threats: unpacking the threats of the use of force 
 
In this paper, I examine officers’ threats of force as a particular type of violence, without 
implying any normative or moralistic interpretation of violence. Of course, by focusing 
on officers’ lawful use of force, I do not intend to deny other relevant issues such as 
alleged wrongdoing or abuse by officers, but simply to focus on their lawful duty. 
                                               
9 At least two articles in prison sociology have directly focused on the issue raised by Becker in ‛what side are we on?’ 
(Liebling, 2001, 2000; Sim, 2003). 
10 The population of prison officers in the detention wing usually included more than two dozen officers. Most of them 
were at least 40 years old; a few were in their twenties. Almost the entire officer population under study was from 
the South of Italy or from Sardinia. 
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Following a symbolic-interactionist sensibility, each interaction is analysed in the light of 
the previous chains of interactions in which those particular actors were involved. Thus, 
as said, the main theoretical framework is based on an application of Collins’ ‛radical 
micro-sociology’ (2004, 2008) and Popitz’s (1990) Phenomenology of Power. In 
particular, Collins develops Goffman’s concepts of interaction ritual and audience of the 
interaction, addressing the issue of emotion more directly. Dealing with violence, Collins 
(2008) further developed his theory of Interaction Ritual Chains (2004), introducing 
crucial concepts such as forward panics, weak victims, supportive audiences and rapid 
shifts in emotional balances, all of which were useful devices during my ethnographic 
observation. Adopting Collins’ micro-sociology of violence, violent interactions and 
threats of force in prison11 can be read as performances developing in an ‘interaction 
ritual chain’ in which each actor displays and defends his or her positive face. Officers try 
to influence both fellow officers and inmates regarding how they ought to be seen and 
treated. Concurrently, they construct and display to different types of audiences both their 
own dominant position in the interaction and their antagonist’s subordination.  
Challenges, provocations and insults, as well as claims and counterclaims between 
the parties, increase, in Collins’ theory, the tension between one another. For Collins 
(2008, p. 20), ‛violent interactions are difficult because they go against the grain of 
normal interaction rituals’. A ‛confrontational tension’ arises, defined as: 
 
[t]he tendency to become entrained in each other's rhythms and emotions means that when the interaction is 
at cross purposes – an antagonistic interaction – people experience a pervasive feeling of tension … At 
higher level of intensity [confrontational tension] shades over into fear. For this reason, violence is difficult 
to carry out, not easy, (Collins, 2008, p. 20).  
 
Violence comes up against a barrier of confrontational tension and fear. For violence to happen there must 
be situational conditions which allow at least one side to circumvent the barrier (Collins, 2012, p. 135). 
 
In my observation, tension was clearly evident most of the time: fear often emerged in 
ethnographic interviews conducted with prison officers during fieldwork. Officers were 
more likely to disclose fearful emotions in one-to-one conversations or in backstage areas 
than in front of prisoners. Many prisoners often displayed fear, more or less openly, 
during confrontations. In other words, both tension and fear are common ingredients of 
the prison interactions I observed. In front of the squad, some prisoners would even show 
trembling and sweating bodies, a red face, very nervous movements, and so on. Officers 
would instead mostly display a militaristic ‛cold’ or ‘poker face’. 
 Although I tend to be sceptical about general arguments, I must admit that 
Collins’ theory often fits quite well with my observations inside. Both his analytical 
toolbox and his emphasis on the interaction and on the sequence of actions were very 
useful. I usually saw officers using the capacity ‛to circumvent confrontational 
tension/fear’ on a daily basis to perform their job ‘as usual’ without displaying any 
difficulty while threatening the use of force or actually becoming violent towards 
prisoners. Few officers working in the emergency squad would be unable to do so; a 
small number would just be a ‛supportive audience’, supporting the intervention just by 
being there; others might try to simply be ‛bystanders’, not engaging in the squad (in 
Goffman’s words, they would do ‘footing’). Bystanders may pretend to put some distance 
                                               
11 Collins deals with actual bodily violence rather than threats or so-called symbolic violence.  
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between themselves and their fellow officers by stepping a few steps away, or by 
contesting it by proxemics or verbal comments.  
 I had to learn how ‛to circumvent confrontational tension/fear’ myself, and to 
perform and display it competently in order to save my face and build my reputation 
among officers, thereby being granted access to the squad interventions. Being tough is a 
clear shared code of masculinity appreciated by many prison officers. My (masculine) 
performance (see also Sim, 1994) during the first squad’s intervention that I witnessed, in 
which I tried to show my toughness despite my fears and emotions, clearly worked as an 
icebreaker and helped me gain acceptance by officers. In doing so, I did not want to cheat 
them, I simply tried to maintain an adequate face. 
My interpretation of Collins’ theory of violence is not limited to the ritual 
situations, but it also takes into account, in a much larger way than Collins, the ways in 
which particular vectors of inequality, and even personal idiosyncrasies and officers’ 
sensibilities (and the lack thereof), influence the course of the interactions. Extending 
Hochschild’s concept of ‘status shield’ (1983), I introduce the binary ‘status magnet vs 
status shield’, underlining the influence of inmates’ status on the officers’ discretionary 
performance, not only shielding prisoners from a particular treatment, but also calling for 
it. 
 In the Phenomenology of power (1990), Popitz directly engages with ‛threatening 
and being threatened’ (pp. 65–84). He shows the intersubjective and interactive 
relationship implied in each ‛threatening structure’ (p. 66) from a phenomenological point 
of view. The shifting and on-going power dynamic in interaction depends on how the 
actors involved participate. Popitz argues that not only the victim who is threatened 
depends on his perpetrator’s acts or threats, but also the perpetrator depends on – and 
becomes constrained by – the subsequent decisions and actions of his or her victim (p. 
68). In other words, officers threatening inmates should not do it without taking into 
account the possible reaction of those who are being threatened. Prisoners are not passive 
recipients of the officers’ threats; they are also actors involved in the situation; agency is 
on both sides, even in such a structured situation in which the power balance is 
particularly uneven.  
  
 
4. The construction of a critical event 
 
Critical events are particular episodes involving one or more prisoners whose particular 
conduct, behaviour or interaction pattern have been formally labelled, or informally 
treated, as critical events in practice by officers dealing with them. Critical events can be 
formally constructed by the book and consequently be written on the appropriate critical 
event register. However, they can also be constructed informally. In my interpretation, a 
critical event occurs each time the wing officer is not able to deal with the situation on the 
wing by himself and consequently asks for the informal intervention of the security 
manager. 
 Each prison officer on duty on the wing is continuously potentially involved in 
violent situations and can respond to them by either turning a blind eye or adopting 
various ‘means of influence’ (Kauffman, 1988) such as negotiation, persuasion, 
inducement, rewards – or, rarely, manipulation. In the flow of violent interactions, only a 
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few of these episodes would be constructed as ‘critical events’, and treated accordingly. 
The construction of a critical event is a far-from-neutral process and implies a set of 
personal values, norms and routines imbued in particular prison officers’ cultures. The 
likelihood that any particular occurrence is transformed into a critical event relates not 
only to its damaging effect or intrinsic violence; rather, it is also linked to other factors 
such as the prisoner’s status and reputation, the previous chain of interactions in which a 
particular prisoner and a particular officer have been involved, personal idiosyncrasies 
and so on. Any violent behaviour, annoying attitude, bullying or even minor sign of 
protest is therefore more or less likely to be constructed as a critical event.  
 Prisoners with particularly low status in prison officers’ eyes were often treated 
differently from those at the top of the status hierarchy;12 interactions were more or less 
likely to be labelled as critical events depending on the particular status of the subjects 
involved and their position.13 Although untangling the diverse dimensions impacting on 
discretion is out of scope here, discretion clearly emerged throughout the observation as a 
structural dimension of the situation (see also Liebling, 2000). Of course, workers’ 
performances are imbued in discretion within any street-level occupations (Lipsky, 1980). 
However, in a custodial institution, discretion is particularly problematic since it may 
reinforce and normalize racism, homophobia and trauma. 
 Two extreme examples of the impact of status magnet vs. status shield may 
suffice to show at least the breadth of officers’ discretion in constructing and managing a 
critical event. On one extreme, persons with very low status, such as ‛gypsies’ [sic.], were 
less likely to be taken seriously; travellers’communities were more likely to be 
considered to be ‛the cause’ of a critical event (although that particular occurrence was 
constructed as a critical event partly because their requests were less likely to be seriously 
dealt with). Travellers’communities and other marginalized groups such as the homeless 
or foreign nationals were therefore more likely to be threatened by officers also as a result 
of less difficult situations after previous negotiation had not produced the intended goal.  
 
Some inmates really look for trouble here... They insist, they call and call again… they continuously call 
me or my colleague for no reason... they never have enough. They do not know what the verb ‘to wait’ 
means. Do they think they are in a hotel or what? Some start banging the toilet doors; others threaten us 
continuously. We do not even hear them anymore. Do they want a lesson? They seem to be looking for it 
intensively now. No problem, we are ready to please them whenever they wish (field note: summary of an 
officer’s comment during an ethnographic interview on the wing). 
 
 At the other extreme, inmates related to organized crime enjoyed much more 
respect and officers treated them accordingly (Varese, 2010). The relationships between 
officers and ‛mafia bosses’ were characterized by a presentation of the Self in which, on 
both sides, facework was used displayed the maintenance of civility, deference, formal 
respect and interactive accommodation (Goffman, 1958). As one officer put it, 
 
                                               
12 Ethnographic research shows that police rarely treat all persons on the street in the same way, regardless of their 
ethnic background. 
13 There is a large and growing literature adopting an intersectionist approach in prison ethnography. It would be 
possible to focus on to how gender/race/class work in the threat of using force (Ricciardelli et al., 2015), and I am 
planning to do it elsewhere. Here, I focus on two extreme cases to convey the essence of the issue. 
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[Mafia] bosses are gentlemen; they respect me as a worker and never disturb me without a good reason 
[like other prisoners often do]. Therefore I respect them and treat them accordingly. Usually, I try to 
respond each and every time they call me. They always say ‘please and ‘thank you’ (field note: verbatim).  
 
 Consequently, officers never used the credible threat of the use of force with a 
‛boss’ in front of me. Some officers justified it by saying that ‛I boss sanno farsi la 
galera’ (a boss knows how to behave properly when ‘doing time’). However, there might 
be other factors in the picture. Indeed, prison officers might fear bosses’ retaliation and 
their capacity – even when incarcerated – to exert violence against them or their family 
outside.  
 
5. Threatening the use of force  
 
Following Popitz (1990), performing a threat is not an easy task. Threatening the use of 
force is costly for officers and strongly influences the credibility and reputation of both 
parties involved in the interaction. After performing a threat, officers are in fact 
dependent on the prisoner’s next move. Officers who do not respond consistently to 
prisoner’s reactions in these chains of interactions can lose their face, not only in front of 
the prisoner, but also in front of their fellow officers and other staff members. Possibly, 
this might be one of the reasons why officers often turn a blind eye in an attempt to avoid 
challenging and unpredictable situations in which they should be ready for bodily 
intervention at the risk of losing their credibility.  
 The threatening frame (Goffman, 1974) would usually be ‘bracketed’ into two 
different configurations. The first threat configuration, which I call the symbolic threat – 
a kind of reinforced ‛authority maintenance ritual’ (Alpert and Dunham, 2004, p. 172) – 
is performed by the simple arrival of the prison officers’ emergency squad on the wing. 
The second threat configuration is what I call the credible threat. Usually, the credible 
threat follows the symbolic threat if, and only if, the latter fails to de-escalate the critical 
event.  
 
5.1. The symbolic threat of the use of force: the emergency squad’s arrival on the wing 
 
A symbolic threat of force is here defined as a display of authority and force by which a 
group of officers, called the ‘emergency squad’, intervenes in a critical situation to take 
control of it. The emergency squad’s arrival on the wing starts the symbolic threat as an 
‛interaction ritual’ (Goffman, 1967, 1961; Collins, 2004). The emergency squad can be 
composed of a number of officers ranging between three and nine, and can be either 
organized formally, looking like a proper military team, or in a looser fashion. The 
emergency squad can move towards the emergency location more or less quickly, 
displaying a more or less threatening attitude towards the prisoners. Any critical event is 
more or less likely to escalate depending on the particular place where it occurs, the 
reputation and attitude of both the prison officers and the inmates involved, as well as the 
presence or the absence of other observers on the scene (including a social researcher). 
Three triggering situations of critical events can be listed: (i) an explicit verbal, face-to-
face command of the superordinate responsible for security; (ii) in response to a sudden 
loud security alarm signalling an emergency on one particular wing; or (iii) as 
reinforcement of an officer’s self-defence after an alleged assault upon an officer 
Commentato [A5]: Preferirei così. 
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(independently of the source of the information and the availability of a formal command 
to intervene).14 
 The physical entrance of the ‛emergency squad’ into the wing visibly introduces 
the issue of force for all the prisoners observing or hearing what is occurring. As a 
researcher and external observer, my first symbolic-threat scene was a very challenging 
and daunting experience, making me feel inadequate and unsure whether to stay or leave. 
A mix of contrasting emotions flooded me, including concern for people’s safety, pity for 
inmates, but also sympathy for the officers. In any ‘normal’ day-to-day life on the wing, 
prisoners mainly deal with one officer at a time. By contrast, the arrival of the emergency 
squad’s members is a visible and audible bodily presence that transforms the wing’s 
atmosphere. The squad is now ready to perform its symbolic display of power in front of 
the prisoners involved in the intervention, moving towards the particular cell (or other 
closed location) where a particular prisoner (or a group of prisoners) has caused a critical 
event. This symbolic intervention can last up to a maximum of 30 or 40 minutes, during 
which time the squad tries to calm down the agitated prisoners to achieve compliance 
(Kauffman, 1988).15 Normally, the symbolic threat would not occur abruptly; instead, it is 
the outcome of the failure of at least two chains of interactions. First, a series of failed 
negotiations have occurred at the wing level, directly involving both the particular 
prisoners and the wing officer. That phase could last for hours or even days, during which 
the prisoner can ‛give trouble’ but not serious enough to be framed as a ‛critical event’. 
Second, a subsequent negotiation begins with the wing manager, asking for help. Usually, 
at this point, a superordinate officer is sent on the wing by the security manager, with the 
goal of negotiating a peaceful solution to the problem (yet, the attitudes of the senior 
officers who frame this intervention vary significantly and impinge on the negotiation 
itself).  
 The squad’s arrival on the wing changes the atmosphere, with the wing often 
becoming quieter, yet occasionally noisier. Usually, the squad enters the wing 
ritualistically and approaches prisoners paternalistically. Even when the tone of voice is 
low, the military hierarchy characterizing the chain of command is displayed by both the 
configuration of the squad and the proxemics of its members. Often, a commander officer 
heads the squad; in his absence, other senior officer in charge act as substitutes. The 
position of each officer within the squad’s configuration mirror their grade and seniority, 
as well as their willingness to be part of the action. At this stage, no real physical 
confrontation or assault happens, because the officers are on one side of the gate, and the 
prisoner(s) on the other. 
 Under such circumstances, all other activities previously going on in the place are 
immediately suspended. Some basic tools of negotiation, such as a chat, a cigarette, or 
exceptionally a plastic cup of coffee, are employed by the head of the squad in an effort 
to avoid a confrontation and open a dialogue, thereby resolving the dispute without 
resorting to physical intervention. Sometimes, different solutions would be extensively 
discussed between the head of the squad and the prisoners. Seldom does the situation 
                                               
14 The emergency squad also provides support to the psychiatric and medical staff by threatening prisoners in an effort 
to help a psychiatrist or a doctor to perform his or her own medical duties with a recalcitrant prisoner who is under 
compulsory medical treatment and would not comply with it by any other means (see Sim, 1990). This issue will be 
addressed elsewhere (Gariglio, 2017). 
15 The emergency squad is constructed in practice when it has to intervene. Only a couple of officers are usually 
formally on duty as an emergency squad. Others would leave their main duty in the case of an emergency.  
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immediately turn into a conflictive one. Usually, it slowly de-escalates and turns into, in 
the officers’ words, ‛just another boring deja vu’. Nevertheless, occasionally the situation 
does not improve, or not quickly enough, and a shift to the next threat configuration 
occurs.  
 Occasionally, the squad’s arrival is followed by a sharp increase of protest on the 
prisoners’ side. Some prisoners are disturbed in one way or another by the arrival of the 
emergency squad and start to shout and yell all kinds of insults towards either the guards 
or the prisoner that had caused the event. Some prisoners feel humiliated, others 
provoked; some feel powerless, other desperate or annihilated by the number of officers; 
some simply ‛hate any guy in a blue uniform’. It should be clear, though, that the 
majority of the daily dozens of critical events either end positively – without further need 
for any explicit symbolic threat by the emergency squad – or are left ‛unnoticed’ by the 
officers, who turn a blind eye. This might support Crewe’s (2011) interpretation of the 
relevance of soft power, even in such a critical custodial setting.  
 To summarize, after a critical event is defined as such, the emergency squad 
arrives quickly on the wing, with the bodily and noisy act of entering the wing 
‛bracketing’ the start of what I call a symbolic threat. Its arrival marks a turning point and 
strongly affects the atmosphere of the place. Often, the simple arrival of the squad in the 
wing is sufficient to end the issue, and the squad eventually leaves the wing. The process 
of de-escalation is then attended by just the wing officer, with or without the security 
manager. However, the squad’s arrival on the wing is not always enough to end the issue, 
in which case a negotiation with the prisoner is engaged, trying to convince him to stop 
behaving ‘stupidly’. 
 
5.2. The credible threat of the use of force 
 
Even in a violent place such as a custodial or psychiatric wing, officers use their force 
rarely. My ethnography thus partly confirms Collins’ thesis. Prison officers are less likely 
to use bodily force than to just threaten it symbolically or credibly. I observed a small 
number of officers’ bodily interventions, but I observed a far greater number of threats. 
This might be interpreted as an effect of my own presence in the field, but Popitz’s (1990) 
theory might also provide a valid alternative explanation. Threats are costly for anybody 
making them, let alone using force with subjects who are likely to have transmissible 
diseases (at least that was the case with the particular subjects in custody where I did my 
ethnography).  
 Shifting from a ‘symbolic threat’ to a ‘credible threat’ is therefore a major move. 
Symbolic threats are the result of the squad’s bodily performance, through which an 
unusually large number of officers enters the wing in a platoon, as explained above. In 
comparison, the credible threat of the use of force is the result of a performance that 
officers give in front of the inmates. The credible threat is, in Popitz’s terms, a promise 
that constrains officers and prisoners. If the credible threat of the use of force does not 
produce the intended results, then force might be used as a consequence. Certainly, some 
officers are particularly prone to use force and do not approve of negotiations (Collins, 
2008); usually however this was not the case in my field. The discovery of a set of scripts 
used by officers to transform their symbolic threats into a credible one was crucial. Two 
scripts appeared particularly relevant. In the first script, one or more officers of the 
12 
 
emergency squad extract and slowly wear gloves standing in front of the prisoners; in the 
second, officers start to move fingers either behind their back or visibly. On some 
occasions, a combination of these two scripts was observed.  By adopting one of these 
two scripts, prison officers ‛signal’ (Gambetta, 2009) to one another and to prisoners that 
the situation is approaching a violent turning point: the use of bodily force and the 
entrance into ‛the tunnel of violence’ (Collins 2012). When the performance of one of the 
two scripts begins, a clear emotional dimension and tension becomes palpable. An officer 
might propose to his colleagues – without necessarily saying anything verbally – to 
follow him and move up to the next level of the intervention, thereby ‛finally stopping 
bullshitting’ (field note). As another officer told me just before the intervention: 
 
Now let’s stop it! Who do you think we are? Social workers, or what? Should I waste my time arguing 
endlessly with him? Do you think I am crazy? Should I become crazy too? It’s simply too much... you can 
see it by yourself, don’t you? (field note: verbatim)  
 
 Officers in the squad do not always agree with the definition of the situation, nor 
do they agree regarding the most appropriate next move. Therefore, some might prefer to 
change their ‘footing’ (Goffman, 1981) to become either the members of a supportive 
audience (Collins, 2008) or simply a bystander keeping some distance from the situation. 
By avoiding direct involvement in action, they would publicly display (either to me or to 
others on the wing) their position towards the particular action being taken and, to some 
extent, towards the group’s values and norms.  Eventually, in most instances, ‛tactics of 
talk’ (Liebling and Tait, 2006) can achieve the intended result, and the situation de-
escalates. While negotiations are considered the best option by most officers, a few 
officers told me in interviews that in the past it was more common to consider negotiation 
negatively, preferring physical confrontation. 
 The outcome of any specific credible threat was unpredictable. Any particular 
situation could produce different outcomes, also depending on what I have called status 
magnet vs status shield. Human beings in flesh and blood, with their own emotions, 
cultures, and idiosyncrasies confront to come up with a solution, or proceed to a physical 
confrontation. Depending on the particular situation and the particular actors involved, 
more or less favourable conditions may turn the situation in one direction or another. In 
other words, simply by enacting the scripts or not – e.g., wearing or not the gloves, 
moving or not the hands– officers bodily coordinate and align themselves to their next 
move, signalling their intention to prisoners, who are urged to take the next move quickly. 
Eventually, the prison officers who are ready for action follow the head of the squad, 
while few others might step aside. According the prisoner’s move, the decision is taken to 
either continue the credible threat or jump quickly to the bodily use of force, opening the 
barred door and starting to fight ‘with no pity’, as one officer told me in an interview 
(Gariglio, 2015).  
 These scripts were invisible to me for months; yet, they were clearly understood 
by all prisoners, who normally changed their behaviour accordingly in response to the 
officers’ signals. Prisoners must quickly decide to either calm down or accepting to fight 
the officers. The situation evolves quickly with very high tension (Collins, 2008), 
especially if the prisoner shows no willingness to negotiate. Officers might then feel 
obliged to behave accordingly, so as not to lose their reputation. As real action 
approaches, even those officers who tried to resist the intervention must join the others – 
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it’s their duty, after all. The escalation might also be provoked by the growing tension and 
excitement either among prisoners or/and officers. At that stage indeed any act could 
easily produce unintended consequences on both sides of the barred door, particularly 
with certain prisoners and/or officers who are more likely than others to interpret the acts 
in the other camp as provocations. 
 On some occasions, the use of force might precipitate because some prisoners 
interpreted the officers’ wearing the gloves as an act of hostility. Following such 
perceived provocation, a prisoner might start to insult, threaten, and display the intention 
to punch officers through the gate. On another occasion, as one officer said to me during 
an intervention, ‘patience is exhausted’. When the barred door gets opened, the violent 
fight erupts. It ends with a prisoner being restrained. Sometimes a prisoner and/or an 
officer also needs medical treatment. More frequently, however, de-escalation occurs, 
without need for bodily use of force. 
 
A few concluding remarks 
 
This paper aimed to unpack some aspects of what emerged in one particular wing of a 
custodial institution by ‘doing’ ethnography (Gobo, 2008). This has been achieved mainly 
by adopting a bricolage of micro-sociological theory and phenomenology, which 
resonate very well with one another, showing how and to what extent constructing a 
‘critical event’, and exerting a threatening either symbolically or credibly are performed 
in practice in that particular field. Moreover, this paper is intended to encourage others to 
study these issues in other contexts and geographies. Studying the most critical and 
challenging duty of prison officers, the lawful use of force, might give scholars a better 
grasp of the actual situations in which, more or less frequently, wrongdoings and crimes 
against prisoners (and vice versa) occur. It might also better informing policy-makers and 
prison managers on the nature of such events. Yet, it is worth recalling how time-
consuming and emotionally challenging it can be. For me in particular, working in such 
claustrophobic setting was draining.  
 Staying mainly in one particular wing proved to be a good way to address this 
issue empirically (contra Crewe, 2009), gaining access to violent interactions as well as 
building enough trust to discuss those interactions with the actors. This paper and my 
forthcoming book (Gariglio, 2017) intend to propose some exploratory results, suggesting 
new paths for the empirical and theoretical inquiry on threats and violence, both in prison 
and beyond. In conclusion, despite the efforts by officers and inmates to relate to each 
other in the wing, it is unfortunate to observe how the officers and the emergency squad 
lack adequate training on how to work with both difficult violent prisoners and mentally 
unstable prisoners. A major policy recommendation stemming form my research thus 
concerns the necessity for more training of officers, in particular more specific training in 
de-escalation techniques. Although the officers used negotiation frequently, their 
knowledge about how to deal with inmates was de facto only based on learning by doing.  
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